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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Erik Sherman Trenkle appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony
domestic violence in the presence of a child. Trenkle contends the district court
committed instructional error by denying his request for a defense of property
instruction.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Trenkle with domestic violence in the presence of a
child for battering

in front of one of their children. (R., pp.47-48, 56-57.)

Prior to trial, Trenkle requested a “defense of property” instruction as set forth in
ICJI 1522. (R., pp.147-149.) Trenkle’s requested instruction was premised on
his assertion that he hit

to protect his phone. (Trial Tr., p.266, L.15 –

p.269, L.16.) The district court denied Trenkle’s requested instruction because
the evidence did not support the instruction. (Trial Tr., p.269, Ls.19-23.) At the
conclusion of trial, the jury found Trenkle guilty.1 (R., pp.242, 265-266.) The
court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with four years fixed. (R., pp.275-277.)
Trenkle timely appealed. (R., pp.280-282.)

1

Trenkle’s first and second trials both ended in a mistrial. (See R., p.226.)
1

ISSUE
Trenkle states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Trenkle’s request for an
I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property instruction?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly reject Trenkle’s request for a defense of
property instruction since the evidence did not support such an instruction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Rejected Trenkle’s Request For A Defense Of
Property Jury Instruction Because The Evidence Did Not Support It
A.

Introduction
Trenkle asserts that the district court erred when it rejected his request for

a defense of property instruction.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-14.) Trenkle has

failed to show error, however, because the district court correctly concluded the
requested instruction was not supported by the evidence.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d
414, 430 (2009). “An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the
instruction.” Id. (citation omitted).
C.

The District Court Correctly Rejected Trenkle’s Request For A Defense Of
Property Instruction Because The Instruction Was Not Supported By The
Evidence
“A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all

matters of law necessary for the jury’s information.”

State v. Severson, 147

Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132).

“This

necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime
charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has
been admitted.’” Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922
(Ct. App. 2004)).

It also includes, when requested, instructions on “every
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defense or theory of the defense having any support in the evidence.” State v.
Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v.
Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328, 986 P.2d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999)). Although
“[e]ach party is entitled to request the delivery of specific instructions,” “such
instructions will be given [only] if they are ‘correct and pertinent.’” Severson, 147
Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 19-2132). “A proposed instruction is
not ‘correct and pertinent’ if it is (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2)
adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) ‘not supported by the facts of the
case.’”

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31 (citing State v.

Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)).
At trial, Trenkle requested a defense of property instruction, which was
based on the theory that he was entitled to use force against

in order to

protect his cellphone. (Trial Tr., p.266, L.15 – p.269, L.16.) The district court
correctly concluded that the evidence did not support a defense of property
instruction.
The pattern instruction for defense of property reads, in relevant part:
When conditions are present which under the law justify a
person in using force in defense of . . . [property in the person’s
lawful possession], that person may use such degree and extent of
force as would appear to be reasonably necessary to prevent the
threatened injury. Reasonableness is to be judged from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person placed in the same position and
seeing and knowing what the defendant then saw and knew. Any
use of force beyond that limit is unjustified.
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(ICJI 1522 (brackets original).)2
Thus, in order to be entitled to a defense of property instruction, there had
to be evidence that Trenkle had possession of the cellphone when he battered
and that the force he used was “reasonably necessary to prevent the
threatened injury” to his cellphone. The record supports the conclusion that there
was no evidence of either.
On the night Trenkle battered

was home with her three

children when Trenkle came over at approximately 10:00 p.m. even though
told him several times not to come over. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.16 – p.143, L.13.)
When Trenkle arrived, he said “that he was tired, wanted to crash out, and fell
asleep on the couch” next to Misty’s and Trenkle’s young son. (Trial Tr., p.144,
L.15 – p.145, L.4.) After Trenkle fell asleep,

“grabbed his cellphone and

went looking through” it and found a “message to a girl asking to be friends with
benefits.” (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.6-14.) After

called and confronted the girl,

she woke Trenkle up and confronted him, too, and told him to leave. (Trial Tr.,
p.145, L.20 – p.146, L.10.)

and Trenkle argued for a few minutes, then

Trenkle went into the bedroom where the couple’s other two children were
sleeping, and went to bed. (Trial Tr., p.146, Ls.12-21.)

continued to tell

Trenkle to leave, but he refused. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.19 – p.147, L.9.) Because
Trenkle would not leave,

grabbed Trenkle’s phone, which was in the room,

and told Trenkle if he was not going to leave, she was going to throw his phone
2

Idaho Code § 19-202 similarly provides, in pertinent part, that “Resistance
sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured . . .
[t]o prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful
possession.”
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“out the door.” (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.9-20.)

then “grab[bed] the phone,” “ran

out the hallway out towards the front door, and opened up the door and tried to
throw it out the door.” (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.21-25.) As

started to throw

Trenkle’s phone, he “pulled [her] back in from [her] shoulders,” and the two
started “mutually fighting on the floor for the phone.” (Trial Tr., p.147, L.25 –
p.148, L.9.)
testified that, “[a]t some point, [she] felt it was getting out of hand,”
so she “dropped the phone and told [Trenkle]” that she dropped the phone, and
told him to “stop” and “get off [her].” (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-13; see also p.207,
L.8 – p.208, L.22.) Trenkle, however, “did not stop.” (Trial Tr., p.148, L.14.)
Instead, Trenkle “grabbed [her] around the neck” and “hit [her] on the top of the
forehead” causing her to “los[e] consciousness for a couple of seconds.” (Trial
Tr., p.148, Ls.14-18, p.151, L.25 – p.152, L.6; see also p.211, Ls.4-8.) When
“came to, [Trenkle] was standing over the top of [her],” so she kicked him
until she “felt [she] had the opportunity to get up.” (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.19-24.)
Trenkle’s attack caused injuries to Misty’s face, including a “goose egg” on her
forehead, bruises under both eyes, and bruises on her arms. (Exhibits 1-12; Trial
Tr., p.214, L.19 – p.215, L.8.)
Trenkle’s proposed defense of property instruction was not “correct and
pertinent” because the cellphone was not in Trenkle’s possession when he first
grabbed

and it was not in either Trenkle’s or Misty’s possession when

Trenkle grabbed

around the neck or when he hit

such, Trenkle could not batter

in the forehead. As

in an attempt to get the phone back from
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her, and he certainly was not entitled to batter her after she no longer had the
phone. Trenkle’s use of force was also not “reasonably necessary to prevent the
threatened injury” to his cellphone. Indeed, Trenkle did not have to use any force
to prevent

from throwing his phone; he only had to leave as

asked

him to do several times. Even if Trenkle was not required to do that, it was not
“reasonably necessary” to grab

around the neck or knock her out after she

no longer had the phone – such acts would not even be necessary if

still

had the phone in her possession. The conclusion that Trenkle was not entitled to
a defense of property instruction is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion
in State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 119 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2005).
The Court described the facts in Walsh as follows:
Walsh and the victim in this case were married. The victim
was contemplating divorce. One morning while Walsh was in the
shower, the victim removed a box of documents from Walsh’s
vehicle that contained the couple’s tax documents and Walsh’s
inheritance papers. The victim hid the box from Walsh so that she
would have the documents for an appointment with her divorce
attorney. Fearing that Walsh would be angry, the victim locked
herself and her five-year-old son in a bedroom. Upon discovering
that the box was missing from his vehicle, Walsh pounded on the
bedroom door, opened the locked door, and demanded to know
where the box was. The victim responded that it was in a safe
place. Walsh started to leave the room and the victim attempted to
shut the door. Walsh pushed the door open and called the victim a
“bitch.” Walsh then pushed the victim with both of his hands, which
caused the victim to stumble back about four feet. The victim
called the police.
Walsh was arrested and charged with
misdemeanor domestic battery in the presence of a child.
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 872, 119 P.3d at 647.
Like Trenkle, Walsh asserted the trial court erred in declining his request
for a defense of property instruction. Walsh, 141 Idaho at 876, 119 P.3d at 651.
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The Court of Appeals disagreed. Id. at 877, 119 P.3d at 652. In doing so, the
Court first noted that, although a “person who lawfully possesses the property
may use resistance sufficient to prevent the offense from occurring,” “[t]he
offense about to be committed must be imminent and the defense is not available
after the offense has already been completed.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-202 and State
v. McNeil, 141 Idaho 383, 386, 109 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2005)). Applying
the law to the evidence presented, the Court held the evidence did “not support
the legal theory of defense of property” because, even assuming “the victim’s
removal of the box of documents from Walsh’s vehicle was unlawful, Walsh’s
actions could not be reasonably interpreted as resistance necessary to prevent
an offense” because, “[a]t the time Walsh battered the victim, the box had
already been removed from Walsh’s vehicle and Walsh did not know its location.”
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877, 119 P.3d at 652. “Therefore, no resistance could have
prevented an unlawful taking. Further, no evidence suggests that there was an
imminent threat that the victim would destroy the documents, which could justify
resistance to prevent such injury.” Id.
Since

had Trenkle’s phone in her possession before Trenkle

battered her, “no resistance could have prevented an unlawful taking.” Further,
although Trenkle knew

had the phone, there was no “imminent threat” that

she would “destroy” the cellphone if Trenkle left and there was certainly no
imminent threat to Trenkle’s phone once

dropped it, told Trenkle as much,

and asked him to get off of her. Nevertheless, Trenkle continued to batter
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As in Walsh, Trenkle was not entitled to a defense of property instruction based
upon the facts of this case.
Even if the trial court erred by not giving a defense of property instruction,
Trenkle is incorrect in his assertion that the state cannot meet its burden of
demonstrating such error was harmless. An instructional error is harmless where
it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the
defendant guilty absent the error.”

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18

(1999); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, this Court can easily
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, had the jury been given the defense of
property instruction, it still would have found Trenkle guilty for at least two
reasons.

First, as noted, Trenkle’s acts were not reasonably necessary to

prevent the threatened harm to his cellphone. Second, Trenkle’s conduct after
he battered

revealed that his violent acts were not to protect his phone, but

were the result of rage. After Trenkle eventually left Misty’s home,

had the

locks changed. (Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.5-16.) Undeterred, Trenkle came back and
removed the door from the hinges and, once inside, he put a picture of Johnny
Cash giving “the bird” in their son’s swing so

would see it when she came

home. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.19 – p.165, L.5.) Trenkle also told different versions of
what transpired, neither of which included any claim that he was only trying to
“defend” his cellphone. Trenkle told the investigating detective that

was

injured when he stuck his arm out as she was “pile driving” him in the bedroom
and

hit her face on his fist. (Trial Tr., p.251, Ls.3-25.) Trenkle later told his
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mother that he was going to “own” what he did, but then suggested that
was injured because their son “head-butted” her. (Exhibits 13, 14.) Given the
totality of the evidence, even if the district court had given the defense of property
instruction, it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.
Trenkle has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination
that he was not entitled to a defense of property instruction. Even if the court
erred, the error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Trenkle’s conviction
and sentence.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2016.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming_________________
for JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of April, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

/s/ Lori A. Fleming_________________
for JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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